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Resumen
Este trabajo analiza la dinámica de las firmas cuando los empresarios tienen una capacidad limitada
de cumplir los contratos financieros. El contrato restringido óptimo es caracterizado bajo esta
imperfección en la presencia de fluctuaciones de productividad y de tasa de interés. Se muestra que el
contrato óptimo implica que las fluctuaciones de productividad y tasa de interés despliegan efectos
amplificados sobre las dinámicas de las firmas, más allá de lo predicho en el caso de un perfecto
cumplimiento de contratos. Más aun, la persistencia de estas fluctuaciones es mayor cuando los
problemas de cumplimiento de contratos son más severos. Estos resultados pueden estar relacionados
con el hecho de que países con un mayor grado de cumplimiento de contratos poseen un desarrollo
financiero más profundo y un mejor desempeño económico.
Abstract
This article analyzes firm dynamics when the entrepreneurs have limited capacity to comply with their
financial contracts. We characterize the optimal constrained contract under this imperfection in the
presence of productivity and interest rate fluctuations. We show that under the optimal contract,
productivity and interest rate fluctuations have amplified effects on the firms’ dynamics, beyond what
would be predicted in the case of perfect enforceability. Moreover, the persistence of these
fluctuations is higher when the compliance problems are more severe. These findings can be related to
the fact that countries with better contract enforceability display deeper financial development and
better economic performance.
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The impact of ¯nancial constraints on the macroeconomic dynamics has been studied
deeply in the last twenty years.1 There have also been many studies that emphasize
¯nancial constraints faced by consumers so as to improve the features of consumption
based asset pricing.2 At the microeconomic level, the implications of ¯nancial constraints
over investment have been largely analyzed empirically. In this context, the ¯nancial
constraints manifests as an external premium over internal ¯nancing that is modelled
exogenously. This premium constrains investment decisions and may imply a higher
sensitivity of investment to cash °ow at the ¯rm level.3 More recently, the e®ect of this
external premium on cross-section asset pricing has been considered by Gomes et al.
(2003).
These models tend to treat the external ¯nancial premium at the microeconomic
level as exogenous, which is quite arbitrary. One exception, however, is the work of
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) which proposes a model where the ¯nancing con-
straints are endogenously derived from limited enforceability problems. In this way,
borrowing constraints and ¯rm size dynamics are jointly determined.4 In this paper,
the authors analyze the implications of productivity °uctuations in the ¯rm dynamics
using the optimal contract. This is important because the ¯nancial arrangements that
are considered in most of the literature of propagation mechanism with borrowing con-
straints are never intertemporally optimal, meaning that contracts provisions are not
contingent on all public information. One exception is the work of Cooley, Marimon
1The most in°uential works in this area are Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Scheinkman and Weiss
(1986), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
2Examples of this kind are Mankiw (1986), Constatanides and Du±e (1996), Alvarez and Jermann
(2000) and Lustig (2001).
3The cash °ow sensitivity of ¯rm investment decisions and its link to ¯nancial constraints has been
studied by Fazzari et al. (1988), Hoshi et al. (1991), Himmelberg and Gilchrist (1995, 1998) and Gomes
(2001).
4In other work Clementi and Hopenhayn (2002) characterize the optimal contract when there is
asymmetric information between entrepreneur and lender in a dynamic setting as well.
1and Quadrini (2004) which embeds the model of Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) in
a general equilibrium framework.
Following the work of Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), this article analyzes the
¯rm dynamics when the entrepreneurs have limited enforcement to the ¯nancial con-
tracts. The optimal contract is characterized and the persistence of the productivity
and interest rate movements is analyzed. One interesting result we obtain is that the
persistence of the shocks increases in economies with lower enforceability.
In the economic environment, entrepreneurs have to borrow from a lender to ¯nance
the initial investment required to start the ¯rm because they do not have funds. Entre-
preneurs use their ¯rm cash °ows each period to repay back they initial debt. However,
they also need to borrow to ¯nance the capital advancement required each period to run
the ¯rm. Therefore, the cash °ows of each period depend on the capital advanced to the
entrepreneur. Additionally, the entrepreneur has limited commitment to the contract
which is given by an outside option that she can gets if she breaches the contract and
the ¯rm disappears. In this context, a bigger outside option implies a lower level of
contract enforceability.
Initially, the value of the ¯rm entitled by the optimal contract to the entrepreneur is
low and consequently she has a high incentive to default the contract. This implies that
capital advancement prescribed by the optimal contract is below its e±cient level. This,
in turn, translates into young ¯rms being smaller and constrained. Hence, the marginal
value of capital advancement is above the opportunistic cost given by the interest rate.
Over time, the entrepreneur will pay the initial debt acquired until a point where the
value of the ¯rm entitled to her by the optimal contract is big enough such that she does
not have incentive to default on the contract.
2The persistence of the productivity and interest rate is due to the fact that during
the phase where the entrepreneur is ¯nancially constrained, all excess of cash °ow goes
to pay the initial debt acquired when starting the ¯rm. Comparing two paths of pro-
ductivity, we can see that the one with higher productivity for at least one period will
pay back the initial debt faster and the ¯rm will reach the unconstrained level sooner.
Similarly, a path with higher interest rate will pay back the initial debt slowly and the
¯rm will reach the unconstrained level later. Moreover, this persistence of productivity
and interest °uctuations is bigger and lasts longer in an environment where the enforce-
ability of contract is more imperfect.
These ¯ndings posit an analytic framework to understand why economies with low
levels of systematic enforceability have less developed ¯nancial markets and economic
performance. In this model, low enforceability will imply an ine±ciency in terms of the
size and external ¯nance for young ¯rms. This link among institutional factors (e.g.,
enforceability of contracts), ¯nancial markets development and economic performance
across countries has been vastly analyzed empirically. La Porta et al. (1997) using cross-
country regressions show that countries with better investor protection have bigger and
broader equity and debt markets. Similarly, Knack and Keefer (1995) analyzing a cross-
country sample concluded that institutions that protect property rights are crucial for
economic growth and higher investment rates. Levine (1999) provided cross-country
evidence supporting the fact that countries with more developed legal and regulatory
system have better developed ¯nancial intermediaries, and consequently grow faster.
The result that economies with lower enforceability of contracts display less exter-
nal ¯nance and investment rates can be consistent with the pattern shown in ¯gure 1.
This ¯gure relates the Investment-GDP ratio to an index of enforceability of contracts
for a cross-section of countries. This index is constructed by La Porta et al. (1998)
and measures whether the country's laws are e±ciently and impartially enforced and
3whether governments tend to change the nature of contracts ex post. Higher values of
this index indicate greater e±ciency in enforcing contracts. The Investment-GDP ratio
is computed from the Penn World Table 6.1 as the average for the period 1980-2000. As
it can be observed from the ¯gure, there is a positive relationship between the aggregate
investment rates and the degree of contract enforceability.
The other element implied by the ¯nancial constraints is the premium of the external
funds over the interest rate. This model emphasizes that this spread is bigger for younger
¯rms. Moreover, this spread will be higher and lasts longer for ¯rms in economies with
lower contract enforceability. This implication is supported by ¯gure 2 which shows the
negative association between the lending spread and the level of contract enforceability
in a cross-section of countries. We use the same index of enforceability displayed in ¯g-
ure 1. The lending spread is calculated from the International Monetary Fund Financial
Statistics as the di®erence between the lending rate and deposit rate in each country for
the period 1980-2000. Hence, countries with better contract enforceability in average
have lower lending spread.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The model is explained in
Section 2. In Section 3, we characterize the main properties of the optimal contract. In
particular, we describe the optimal capital advancement and repayment policies, and the
evolution of the value entitled to the entrepreneur over time as implied by the contract.
The implications for ¯rm dynamics and persistence of shocks are described in section 4.
Section 5 states ¯nal remarks. Two appendixes are in the end of the article. Appendix A
contains the proofs of the main results and appendix B describes shortly the parameters
considered for the numerical simulations.
42 Model
The model is built on the work of Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) to include interest
rate °uctuations and analyze the link between persistence and contract enforceability.
Time is discrete and the horizon is in¯nite. At t = 0 an entrepreneur has an investment
opportunity of starting a new ¯rm which requires an initial investment of I0. After this
initial investment, the ¯rm has a stream of revenues R(k;s) in each period where k is
the capital input and s 2 S ½ R is a productivity shock. The entrepreneur has limited
liability and starts with zero wealth requiring a lender to ¯nance the initial investment
and advancement of capital every period. Entrepreneur and lender are both risk neutral
and discount the °ows between the beginning of period and the end of it with same
interest rate r > 0.
The productivity shock s follows a Markov process with a cumulative transition
probability function given by Pr(st+1 = s0jst = s) = F(s0js). Also, the interest rate
r 2 ¤ ½ R follows a Markov process with cumulative transition of probability given by
Pr(rt+1 = r0jrt = r) = G(r0jr).
Timing of events is as follows. First, the productivity s and interest rate r are re-
alized, then the capital input is purchased, sales takes place, and revenues R(k;s) are
collected.5 The entrepreneur has lack of commitment to the contracts, but she is the
only one able to run the ¯rm. This is the root of the endogenous ¯nancial constraints. In
contrast, the lender has full commitment to the contract and access to a perfect capital
markets.
If the entrepreneur defaults on the contract she can get an outside option O(k;s;r).
5Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) also include the possibility of liquidation just after the real-
ization of productivity. Here is not included this possibility to focus the analysis on the persistence of
interest rate and productivity shocks and its connection with the level enforceability. However, when
the liquidation value is low the decision of liquidation is never optimal in the contract.
5This outside option depends on the capital input k, the productivity s and interest rate
r. Additionally, the outside option will depend on a cost of defaulting. This cost of
defaulting is connected to the level of enforceability guaranteed in the economy. The
lower the level of enforceability of contracts the cheaper the cost of defaulting. Hence,
we consider economies with a more imperfect level of ¯nancial contract enforceability as
economies with a cost of defaulting lower and consequently a higher outside option for
the entrepreneur.
In this context, a long term contract speci¯es a contingent capital advancements kt
from lender to the ¯rm that take place at the beginning of the period and cash °ow
distribution consisting of a dividend dt and a payments to the lender R(kt;st)¡dt which
take place at the end of the period. Since the entrepreneur has no additional funds the
limited liability implies that dt ¸ 0. A history at t is ht = fkn;dn;sn+1;rn+1g
t¡1
n=0. H is
the set of all possible histories.
De¯nition 1 A feasible contract is a mapping C : H ! R2
+ such that 8 ht 2 H,
C(ht) = (kt;dt).
At time zero, a competitive ¯nancial intermediary or lender o®ers a long term con-
tract to the entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur accepts the contract, the lender pays
for the initial investment I0 and makes the advancement of capital as described by the
contract as long as the entrepreneur meets the payments stipulated in the contract and
there is no default. If the entrepreneur accomplishes the terms of the contract, the ¯rms
remains active. Otherwise, the ¯rm is terminated.
62.1 Contract with Perfect Enforceability
In the case of perfect enforceability, the entrepreneur can credibly commit to long term
contracts without any additional conditions. The presence of many competitive lenders
and the fact that lender and entrepreneur discount the cash °ow at the same rate guar-
antee that a long term contract will maximize the total expected discounted pro¯ts.
Let denote the unconstrained pro¯t function conditional in the current level of pro-
ductivity and interest as:6
¼(s;r) = max
k¸0
fR(k;s) ¡ (1 + r)kg (1)
To guarantee that ¼(s;r) exists we consider the following assumption:
Assumption 1
1. R(k;s) is increasing in both arguments
2. R(k;s) is continuous in k
3. For each s 2 S, R(k;s) ¡ (1 + r)k is quasiconcave in k and has a maximum
4. The function R(k;s) ¡ (1 + r)k is bounded
To obtain the total surplus of the match in this unconstrained optimal setting we use




f¼(s;r) + E[ ~ W(s
0;r
0)j(s;r)]g (2)
6From the speci¯cation below is clear that since the capital is advanced at the beginning of the
period and the revenues are collected at the end of the period, the opportunity cost of the capital k in
the project is (1 + r).
7With perfect capital markets Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that the ¯nancial
structures of the ¯rms is irrelevant for their value. As it is expected, this model with
perfect enforceability obtains the same conclusion. When the Modigliani-Miller theorem
applies, the e®ects of productivity and interest °uctuations on the ¯rm dynamics are
independent of its ¯nancial structure. As we will see below this irrelevance conclusion
breaks down when there is limited contract enforceability.
2.2 Contracts with Limited Enforceability
When the entrepreneur has the choice to default, one key object is the outside option
which will determinate the severity of the ¯nancial constraint. In principle, we just
assume a generic form for the outside option O(k;s;r). In this way, the model can nest
alternative form for the outside investment opportunities and cost of defaulting.
To simplify the characterization of the optimal contract we consider the following
assumption:
Assumption 2
1. O(0;s;r) = 0.
2. O is a continuous function
3. O is non-decreasing in k and s.
Assumption 2.1 helps to simplify the derivation of the optimal constrained contract.
A long term contract speci¯es a history dependent contingent advances of capital and
a dividend distribution. The contract implicitly de¯nes a value Vt for the entrepreneur
and long term debt Bt for the lender. The total value of the ¯rm is Wt = Vt + Bt. Bt
is labelled as the long term debt and kt as the short term debt. Let Vt+1(s0;r0) denote
8the continuation entrepreneur value at the beginning of period t + 1 after the history







A feasible contract is enforceable if the triplet (kt;dt;Vt+1(s0;r0)) satis¯es (3) after
any history ht. Now we can see that the recursive formulation is more apparent be-
cause the continuation contract after any history is also enforceable. In other words, let
­(s;r) µ R2 be the set of values for the long term debt B and entrepreneur value V such
that there exists an enforceable contract with initial values B0 = B and V0 = V when
the initial productivity and interest rate are s and r, respectively. The set of optimal
contracts gives (Bt;Vt) in the frontier of ­(st;rt) for all t. To close what point of the
frontier we are going to be looking at, we assume the existence of many competitive
lenders. This condition gives all bargaining power to the entrepreneur and the lender
will break even. We summarize this discussion with the following de¯nition:
De¯nition 2 An equilibrium contract C(¢) is feasible, enforceable, and gives the high-
est possible value to the borrower consistent with the lender breaking even if V0 =
supfV : (B;V ) 2 ­(s0;r0); B ¸ I0g when the initial productivity and interest rate are
s0 and r0, respectively.
In other words, the optimal contract that we will describe in the next section it
will be the equilibrium contract that prevails in a decentralized economy with many
competitive lenders.
3 Characterization of the Optimal Contract
The purpose of this section is to give an analytical solution to the optimal contract. This
characterization will allow us to describe the role of the endogenous ¯nancial constraints
9in the propagation of interest rate and productivity °uctuations in the ¯rm dynamics.
It can be inferred from last section it is easier to use a recursive formulation to describe
the optimal contract.
To obtain the recursive speci¯cation note that the values Vt+1(s0;r0) for future con-
tingencies provide a summary for the future contract and together with (kt;dt;st;rt) are
su±cient to verify the enforcement constraint (3). Also, Vt is a state variable that sum-
marizes the history of ¯rm value that the contract gives to the entrepreneur. This is the
part of the total value of the ¯rm that is entitled to the entrepreneur by the contract.7
In every period, given initial values Vt = V , st = s, rt = r, the contract speci¯es a pair
(k;d) and a continuation values V (s0;r0). In turn, the continuation values V (s0;r0) will
determine investment and dividends in the future. The entrepreneur value has to be the




(d + E[V (s
0;r
0)j(s;r)]) (4)
This is also called the `promise-keeping constraint'.
By Assumption 2.1 we can conclude that V (s0;r0) can be supported by an enforceable
contract if and only if V (s0;r0) ¸ 0. This is a domain restriction that simpli¯es the
determination of the optimal contract. Also, the limited liability condition prevents
negative dividends and therefore, we can write the enforcement constraint as:
O(k;s;r) · V (5)
Moreover, we can rewrite the limited liability condition (d ¸ 0) as:






0)j(s;r)] · V (6)
Since the total value of the ¯rm is the sum of the long term debt (Bt) and entre-
preneur value (Vt), maximizing the long term value given a level of entrepreneur value
is equivalent to maximizing the total value of the ¯rm given that level of entrepreneur
value. Hence, the optimal debt contract maximize the total value of the ¯rm W given V ,
s and r. In other words, the total value of the ¯rm in the optimal contract is a function
W(V;s;r) which represents the total present value of the ¯rm starting with entrepre-
neur value V , productivity s, and interest rate r. Therefore, the dynamic programming
problem can be written as:
W(V;s;r) = max
k;V (s0;r0)¸0
[R(k;s) ¡ (1 + r)k + E[W(V (s0;r0);s0;r0)j(s;r)]]
1 + r
s.t. (5) and (6)
(7)
From above, we can see that the static decision of k can separated of the intertem-




fR(k;s) ¡ (1 + r)kg
s.t. (5)
(8)
Denote ~ k(s;r) = inffk : R(k;s)¡(1+r)k = ¼(s;r)g and V u(s;r) = O(~ k(s;r);s;r).
This last term is the smallest continuation entrepreneur value that is compatible with
static pro¯t maximization. Thus, if V < V u(s;r) the enforcement constraint (5) is
binding and ¦(V;s;r) < ¼(s;r). In the other case when V ¸ V u(s;r), the enforcement
constraint is not binding and ¦(V;s;r) = ¼(s;r). We make the following assumption
11regarding V u(s;r):
Assumption 3 The function V u is bounded.
Now the problem in (7) can be written as:
W(V;s;r) = max
V (s0;r0)¸0




Result 1 Under some conditions on the ¯rst and second derivatives of the functions
R(¢) and O(¢), ¦(¢) have the following properties:
1. ¦ is continuous, uniformly bounded
2. ¦ strictly increasing in V for V < V u(s;r)
3. ¦ is concave in V , and strictly concave if V < V u(s;r)
Proof: See appendix A
As we concluded above when V ¸ V u(s;r), the static problem of choosing k is
equivalent to the unconstrained e±cient. However, this may not ensure that the total
present value of the ¯rm W(V;s;r) = ~ W(s;r) because the entrepreneur value V must
also guarantee that the enforcement constraint will not bind in the future. To see this,
suppose that V u(s;r) < V < 1
1+rE[V u(s0;r0)j(s;r)] and let V (s0;r0) be the solution to (9)
starting from (V;s;r). Thus, it must be the case that V u(s0;r0) > V (s0;r0) for a subset
of the space state of non-zero measure. Hence, the unconstrained pro¯t maximization
cannot be guaranteed in some states in the next period.
12Let V n(s;r) denote the minimum level of current initial value for the entrepreneur
that is needed to guarantee that the enforcement constraint will not bind for at least n
periods, including the current one, when the state is (s;r). A recursive formulation for










where V 0(s;r) = 0.
De¯ne ~ V (s;r) = limn!1 V n(s;r). Since V n(s;r) is an increasing sequence and uni-
formly bounded, the limit exists. Moreover, using the Lebesgue's dominated convergence
theorem, it follows that 8 (s;r):








1. W(V;s;r) is weakly increasing in V
2. 8 V ¸ ~ V (s;r), W(V;s;r) = ~ W(V;s;r)
3. 8 V < ~ V (s;r), W(V;s;r) < ~ W(s;r)
Proof: See Appendix A
Result 3 W is strictly concave in V if W(V;s;r) < ~ W(s;r).8
Proof: See Appendix A
Result 4 Suppose W(V;s;r) is concave in V for all (s;r). Then if V1 < ~ V (s;r) it
follows that W(V2;s;r) < W(V1;s;r) for all V2 < V1
8Weak concavity of W in V is obtained directly from the fact that ¦ is weakly concave in V using
dynamic programming arguments.
13Proof: See Appendix A
Result 5 If Vt(1+rt) < Et[~ V (st+1;rt+1)j(st;rt)] then the optimal contract requires that
Vt(1 + rt) = Et[Vt+1(st+1;rt+1)j(st;rt)] so that no dividends are distributed.9
Proof: See Appendix A
The last four results establish some basic properties of the optimal constrained value
function. This will be the prevailing total value of the ¯rm when there exists many com-
petitive lenders. A numerical simulation con¯rms these properties of W.10 The shape of
W for this numerical example is showed in ¯gure 3 and 4. These ¯gures highlight that
the value function W is increasing and concave in V as long as V is below ~ V . For values
of V above ~ V the value function is horizontal because the ¯rm is no longer constrained.
Also, we can see that W is decreasing in the interest rate (r) and increasing in the
productivity level (s).
The monotonicity of W on V shows that the Modigliani and Miller Theorem fails
with limited contract enforceability because highlights a tradeo® between the value of
the ¯rm (W) and the ¯nancial structure (V ). The concavity of W on V implies that
the magnitude of this tradeo® is less signi¯cative as the entrepreneur value on the ¯rm
(V ) increases. Finally, when the value entitled to the entrepreneur is high enough
(V ¸ ~ V (s;r)) this tradeo® disappears.
4 Firm Dynamics
As opposed to a model that takes the premium of the external ¯nancing as exogenous,
this model o®er a crucial link between borrowing constraints and ¯rms dynamics. The
9The limited liability condition is a lower bound in the dividends. Hence, we can have a lower bound
bigger than zero and the ¯rm would distribute dividends even when it was constrained.
10The explanations of the parameters used in the numerical simulation is described in Appendix B.
14premium over external ¯nancing will depend on the entire history of shocks hitting the
¯rm. In this context, this section addresses three main issues. First, it analyzes how on
average the ¯rms grows over time as they are constrained. Second, it states conditions
that imply persistence of the productivity and interest °uctuations over time. Third, it
considers how the persistence can increase as the enforceability problems become more
severe.
4.1 Age E®ects
The following result states that on average the ¯rm increases over time when it is con-
strained. Intuitively, when the ¯rm is constrained the limited liability will be binding
and the entrepreneur value V will increase in average to the rate of the interest rate.
Since the total value of the ¯rm W is increasing in the entrepreneur value V , the total
value of the ¯rm W will also expand in average over time.
Result 6 Conditional on the state (s;r) Vt(s;r) in the optimal contract increases over
time.
Proof. Assuming the ¯rm is still constrained, the ¯rst order condition for the continu-
ation value Vt+1(st+1;rt+1) at the state (st+1;rt+1) is given by:
W1(Vt+1(st+1;rt+1;st+1;rt+1) = ¸ (12)





¦1(Vt(st;rt);st;rt) + ¸ (13)




¦1(Vt(st;rt);st;rt) + W1(Vt+1(st+1;rt+1);st+1;rt+1) (14)
If we consider st = st+1 = s and rt = rt+1 = r then Vt(s;r) · Vt+1(s;r) given ¦1 ¸ 0
and concavity of W in V .
4.2 Persistence
A key issue in macroeconomics is understanding what lies behind the propagation of
economics °uctuations. Along this line is the question of what creates the persistence
of the shocks. Several models have been developed to capture some mechanism of per-
sistence. However, few models address this question in an optimal contract framework
and therefore it is not clear whether the borrowing constraints itself or the lack of more
¯nancial instruments to diversify idiosyncratic risks drive the result. This distinction
is very important since each time there are more ¯nancial instruments that allows the
agents to hedge better. If the reason of the macroeconomic propagation mechanism of
¯nancial frictions is only due to a lack of ¯nancial instruments, one would expect that
this propagation will loss relevance as new ¯nancial instruments are available. However,
this model o®ers an approach of borrowing constraints in a optimal contract context
(i.e. with all contingent ¯nancial instruments available) where one can see the extent of
this constraints alone as a propagation mechanism. The focus in this section is to give
conditions that characterize persistence of productivity and interest rate shocks.
Result 7 If W is strictly concave in V for V < ~ V (s;r) then W12 > 0 and W13 < 0 at
an interior solution so that any optimal continuation entrepreneur value V (s0;r0) must
be non-decreasing in s0 and non-increasing in r0.
16Proof: See Appendix A
Assumption 4
1. 8 s0, F(s0js) is non-increasing in s
2. 8 r0, G(r0jr) is non-increasing in r
This assumption states a ¯rst order stochastic dominance property in the conditional
distribution of the shocks.
Assumption 5














We de¯ne positive persistence of the productivity shocks as the fact that ¯rm size
and entrepreneur value increase with past productivity shocks after controlling for the
current one. Formally, let assume two paths that start from the same value V0: f(s0;r0),
(s1;r1), (s2;r2), :::, (st;rt)g and f(s0;r0), (s0
1;r1), (s0
2;r2), :::, (s0
t;rt)g such that si ¸ s0
i
i = 1;:::;t. Denoting as fVjgt
j=1 and fV 0
jgt
j=1 the optimal value to the entrepreneur
implied by these two paths, the positive persistence of productivity shocks implies that
Vj ¸ V 0
j 8 j = 1;:::;t.
Similarly, we can state the positive persistence of interest rate shocks. Having two




such that ri · r0
i i = 1;:::;t, the positive persistence of interest rate shocks implies that
Vj ¸ V 0
j where fVjgt
j=1 and fV 0
jgt
j=1 are the optimal entrepreneur value deduced from
17these two paths.
Result 8 Suppose that ¦, F and G satisfy assumptions 4 and 5 then the optimal con-
tract displays positive persistence.
Proof: See Appendix A
The persistence comes from the fact that the entrepreneur is constrained. We know
that in some moment in the future she will reach the unconstrained region where she
will not have incentive to default. The entrepreneur will get faster to the unconstrained
region if she has a better history of shocks because that allows to pay back the initial
debt sooner and increases faster her value on the ¯rm.
4.3 Level of Enforceability and Persistence
Several studies have remarked that the volatility of economic performance in developing
countries is bigger than in those more developed. Other empirical studies have empha-
sized the higher propagation of shocks in developing economies are due to a more severe
¯nancial frictions. Lower of enforceability is one institutional factor that makes that the
¯rms of the developing countries face more severe ¯nancing constraints. Hence, we can
use this model to ask whether lower enforceability constraints imply higher persistence
of shocks.
We do not have general results, but using the numerical simulation we analyze this
question comparing the persistence of one period shock in productivity and interest rate
for two economies with di®erent levels of enforceability. The persistence of these two
type of shocks are displayed in ¯gure 5 and 6.
18The responses to these shocks are computed comparing the pro¯le of the variables
with a base path. The base path is the one obtained with a constant productivity level
of s = 1 and interest rate of r = 3%. Hence, the response of the entrepreneur value is
the percentage deviation of the path deducted with a reduction of 7.7% in productivity
at period t = 1 with respect to the base path.
The outside option is denoted by O(k;s;r) = ¸k. As noted earlier a lower outside
option indicates a higher level of contract enforceability. For that reason, we denote
¸ = 2:8 as an economy with better contract enforceability than with ¸ = 3:2.
It is worth noting that these ¯gures also display the variable called premium. This is
the external ¯nance premium that has been computed as the excess of marginal value of
the capital advancement. Formally, the premium at t is computed as R1(kt;st)¡(1+rt).
Figure 5 shows the responses to a shock in the ¯rm productivity. After a produc-
tivity reduction of one period, the ¯rm dynamics in both economies display persistence
re°ected in that the entrepreneur value stays at a lower level than the base path for
many periods. More interestingly, the speed of going back to the base path is faster in
the economy with better contract enforceability. The response in the capital advance-
ment resembles that of the entrepreneur value showing again that the deviations die
out faster in an economy with better enforceability. The premium responses also stress
the persistence. After an instantaneous reduction in the premium at the moment of
the reduction in productivity, the persistence implies that the ¯rm will be constrained a
longer numbers of period and consequently it will have a higher premium than the base
path. Moreover, the premium will return to the base path slower in the economy with
lower contract enforceability.
The e®ects on the same variables under an interest rate shock are displayed in ¯g-
19ure 6. The entrepreneur value stays a lower level even after the interest reduction has
occurred too many periods ago. This is the manifestation of the persistence of this kind
of °uctuations. The e®ect of the interest rate reduction disappear a little faster over
time in the economy with better enforceability. Similarly, the reduction in the capital
advancement is persistent but in the economy with lower enforceability this e®ect stays
longer. Initially, the premium reduces with the drop in the interest rate. However,
since the ¯rm will be constrained longer, the premium has to be above the base path
afterwards. Again, this persistence in the premium is higher for the economy with worse
contract enforceability.
Hence, a better enforceability of ¯nancial contract {understood as lower outside op-
tion to the entrepreneur{ implies that young ¯rms will be constrained for a shorter
period of time and they will reach the unconstrained region sooner. As a consequence,
the propagation mechanism of ¯nancial constraints will be less severe under better en-
forceability of contracts. Also, less imperfect enforceability will lead to less ine±ciency
in the size and external ¯nance of young ¯rms.
5 Final Remarks
This article presents a model where the propagation of shocks under borrowing con-
straints operates in an optimal contract context. One interesting element has been the
inclusion of the °uctuations of the interest rate. Hence, there is a pass-through of in-
terest rate movements to the external ¯nancing premium that is modelled endogenously.
We have proved that in the optimal constrained contract the e®ect of productivity
and interest rate movements a®ect the size and capital input advancement beyond what
a model with perfect enforceability of the ¯nancial contracts would predict. Under some
conditions the ampli¯cations can be very powerful when the enforceability problems are
20severe.
This model also o®ers a rationale to understand why economies with lower enforce-
ability can be exposed to higher ampli¯cation and persistence of the productivity and
interest rate °uctuations. This element is very important because traditionally macro-
economics models with ¯nancial frictions characterize developing and developed coun-
tries in the same degree of extension. The endogenous ¯nancial constraints obtained
from problems of lack of commitment of contracts provided one way to distinguish the
level of borrowing constraints depending on the degree of systematic enforceability in an
economy. Recently the work of Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2004) has emphasized
the persistence of productivity shock and volatility of the output increase in economies
with lower enforceability of contracts. Also, Bergoeing et al. (2002) suggest banking
deregulation and bankruptcy laws in Chile that made that ine±cient ¯rms be replaced
for more e±cient ¯rms as key factor to understand the better economic performance
of Chile than Mexico after the debt crises of early 1980. This conclusions also can be
expressed as the higher level of enforceability of contract in Chile than Mexico could be
a force behind the weaker economic growth in Mexico than Chile during the eighties and
nineties. The severity of enforceability problems in developing countries has also been
stressed for several works to explain crises and high vulnerability to external shocks.11
One interesting extension to consider along these lines is to analyze empirically the
microeconomic implications in economies with di®erent level of enforceability. For in-
stance, the stationary cross-sections distribution of pro¯ts and size of ¯rms can have
a di®erent pattern in two identical industries with a dissimilar levels of enforceability.
This could be analyzed comparing the cross-sectional distribution of ¯rms in the same
11Schneider and Tornell (2004) have enforceability problems as one ingredient to explain boom-
bust episodes in middle income countries. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) also use enforceability
problems to explain the relevance of collateral to secure the loans in a developing economy which in
turn has signi¯cative macroeconomic ampli¯cation of external shocks.
21industry for countries with high enforceability vis-a-vis countries with low enforceabil-
ity. Braun (2003) is recent example that provides empirical evidence about industrial
performance in di®erent countries as a way to shed light on the relevance of the ¯nancial
markets imperfections across countries.
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246 Appendix A: Properties of the pro¯t function and
Proofs of Results
This appendix contains proofs of the main results stated in the article. It also describes
further features of the objects that characterize the optimal contract.
A.1. De¯nitions of derivatives of ¦. If R and O are twice continuously
di®erentiable and V < V u(s;r), applying the envelope theorem and the ¯rst order
condition in (8) we have the following expressions:
² ¦1 = (R1(k;s) ¡ (1 + r))=O1(k;s;r).
² ¦2 = R2(k;s) ¡ (R1(k;s) ¡ (1 + r))O2(k;s;r)=O1(k;s;r)
² ¦3 = ¡(R1(k;s) ¡ (1 + r))O3(k;s;r)=O1(k;s;r) ¡ k
² ¦11 =
R11(k;s)O1(k;s;r) ¡ O11(k;s;r)(R1(k;s) ¡ (1 + r))
O1(k;s;r)3
² ¦12 = ¡O2(k;s;r)
R11(k;s)O1(k;s;r) ¡ O11(k;s;r)(R1(k;s) ¡ (1 + r))
O1(k;s;r)3
+




R12(k;s)O1(k;s;r) ¡ O12(k;s;r)(R1(k;s) ¡ (1 + r))
O1(k;s;r)2
² ¦13 = ¡O3(k;s;r)
R11(k;s)O1(k;s;r) ¡ O11(k;s;r)(R1(k;s) ¡ (1 + r))
O1(k;s;r)3
¡




O1(k;s;r) ¡ O13(k;s;r)(R1(k;s) ¡ (1 + r))
O1(k;s;r)2
A.2. Sign of Derivatives. If V < V u(s;r)
² ¦1 > 0 just by the assumptions
² ¦2 > 0 if R2 > (R1 ¡ (1 + r))O2=O1
² ¦3 < 0 if k > ¡(R1 ¡ (1 + r))O3=O1
² ¦11 · 0 if R11O1 · O11(R1 ¡ (1 + r))
² ¦12 ¸ 0 if R12O1 ¡ O12(R1 ¡ (1 + r)) ¸ 0
² ¦13 · 0 if ¡O3¦11O2
1 · O1 ¡ O13(R1 ¡ (1 + r))
Proof of Result 1.
The ¯rst property is a direct application of the maximum theorem using the condi-
tions stated in assumptions 1 and 2. The continuous di®erentiability of ¦ comes from
the continuous di®erentiability of R and O. The second property is a direct consequence
from the fact that the lagrange multiplier in the constraint will be strict positive when
V < V u(s;r) and by the envelope theorem ¦1 is equal to that lagrange multiplier. Us-
ing the fact that R11O1 < O11(R1 ¡ (1 + r)) from A.2. we get that ¦11 < 0 when
V < V u(s;r). Also, when V ¸ V u(s;r) we know that ¦(V;s;r) = ¼(s;r) and ¦1 = 0
which implies that ¦11 = 0.
Proof of Result 2.
26First, the property that W is weakly increasing in V is a direct application of the
dynamic programming arguments using the fact that ¦ is weakly increasing in V .
The second property can be proved using the fact that the dynamic programming
equation preserve this property. Let assume that W(^ V ;s0;r0) = ~ W(s;r) for ^ V ¸
~ V (s0;r0). If V ¸ ~ V (s;r) by the de¯nition of ~ V we have that V ¸ E[~ V (s0;r0)j(s;r)]=(1+r)
and therefore, ~ V (s0;r0) can be implemented as continuation value. By assumption we
obtain W(~ V (s0;r0);s0;r0) = ~ W(s0;r0). Since V ¸ ~ V (s;r) we know that V ¸ V u(s;r) and
















The last equality comes directly from the unconstrained dynamic programming equa-
tion (2).
The third property can be shown using an induction argument. The idea is to prove
that V < V n(s;r) implies W(V;s;r) < ~ W(s;r) and this holds for all n 2 N. For n = 1
we can see that V < V 1(s;r) = V u(s;r) implies that ¦(V;s;r) < ¼(s;r) and directly
we can obtain W(V;s;r) < ~ W(s;r). Now, let assume that the statement is true for any
n 2 N and then show that the same statement is also true for n + 1. If V < V n+1(s;r)
we have two cases: either V < V u(s;r) or V u(s;r) · V < E[V n(s0;r0)j(s;r)]=(1 + r).
In the ¯rst case we know that ¦(V;s;r) < ¼(s;r) and we obtain the statement as be-
fore. In the second case, we know that some subset £ µ S £ ¤ with strictly positive
measure satis¯es V n(s0;r0) > V (s0;r0) 8(s0;r0) 2 £, where V (s0;r0) is the optimal con-
27tinuation value for the next period. Hence, W(V (s0;r0);s0;r0) < ~ W(s0;r0) for (s0;r0) 2 £
which implies E[W(V (s0;r0);s0;r0)j(s;r)] < E[ ~ W(s0;r0)j(s;r)]. This, in turn, makes that
W(V;s;r) < ~ W(s;r) concluding then the induction proof.
Proof of Result 3.
If V < ~ V (s;r) it should be that there exists n 2 N such that V < V n(s;r). We will
show by induction on n that this implies that W is strictly concave in a neighborhood of
V . For n = 1 we have V < V u(s;r) and ¦ will be strictly concave in a neighborhood of V
which implies W will be also strictly concave applying standard dynamic programming
arguments. Let assume that the statement is true for n (i.e., V < V n(s;r) ) W strictly
concave in V ) and prove that it is true for n+1. By assumption if V < V n+1(s;r), it is
possible that either V < V u(s;r) or V u(s;r) · V < E[V n(s0;r0)j(s;r)]=(1 + r). In the
¯rst case, we get the strictly concavity using the same arguments as when n = 1. In
the second case, we know there exists a set £ ½ S £ ¤ with strictly positive measure
such that V (s0;r0) < V n(s0;r0) 8(s0;r0) 2 £, where V (s0;r0) is the optimal continuation
value. Since W(V (s0;r0);s0;r0) is strictly concave function in a neighborhood of V (s0;r0)









will be strictly concave in a neighborhood of V . This completes the induction argu-
ment.
Proof of Result 4.
We will show this result by contradiction. Suppose that V2 < V1 and W(V2;s;r) =
W(V1;s;r) for some V2 < V1 < ~ V (s;r). Then by concavity:
W(V1;s;r) ¸ aW(V2;s;r) + (1 ¡ a) ~ W(s;r)
28where a = (~ V (s;r) ¡ V1)=(~ V (s;r) ¡ V2) 2 (0;1). By assumption this leads to
W(V1;s;r) ¸ ~ W(s;r) which is a contradiction with the result 2.
Proof of Result 5.
Since Vt(1 + rt) < Et[~ V (st+1;rt+1)j(st;rt)] we obtain that
Et[Vt+1(st+1;rt+1)j(st;rt)] < Et[~ V (st+1;rt+1)j(st;rt)],
where Vt+1(st+1;rt+1) is the optimal continuation value. There exists then a set £ ½ S£
¢ with strict positive measure such that Vt+1(s0;r0) < ~ V (s0;r0) 8(s0;r0) 2 £. Using the
result 2 we can conclude that Et[W(Vt+1(st+1;rt+1);st+1;rt+1)j(st;rt)] < Et[ ~ W(st+1;rt+1)j(st;rt)].
This implies that the constraint (6) is binding in the constrained dynamic programming
problem (9) so that Vt(1 + rt) = Et[Vt+1(st+1;rt+1)j(st;rt)] and therefore dt = 0.
Proof of Result 7.
Consider the problem:
g(V;s;r) = maxE[W(V (s0;r0);s0;r0)j(s;r)]
s.t. E[V (s0;r0)j(s;r)] · (1 + r)V
Consider s2 > s1 and assuming W12 ¸ 0 and using the optimality condition for the
continuation of the entrepreneur value, we get W1(V (s1;r0);s1;r0) = W1(V (s2;r0);s2;r0) <
W1(V (s1;r0);s2;r0) which in turn implies V (s2;r0) ¸ V (s1;r0) by concavity of W in V .




0)j(s2;r)] ¸ E[V (s
0;r
0)j(s1;r)]
Now let V i(s0;r0) the optimal continuation value from (V;si;r). Since







29we can obtain that V 1(s0;r0) ¸ V 2(s0;r0) for (s0;r0) 2 £ µ S £ ¢ with £ hav-
ing strictly positive measure. Moreover, the optimality condition for the continua-
tion value and the strictly concavity of W in V imply that V 1(s0;r0) ¸ V 2(s0;r0) 8
(s0;r0) 2 S £ ¢. Having this, we can prove that if W(V;s;r) is strictly concave in V
for V < ~ V (s;r), ¦12 ¸ 0 and ¦ isconcave in V , then W12 ¸ 0. We will show that
the Bellman equation maps the set of functions with positive cross-partial derivatives
into itself. Suppose that we start with a function W12 ¸ 0. Using the envelope theo-
rem, it follows that g1(V;si;r) = (1 + r)W1(V i(s0;r0);s0;r0). If s2 > s1 from above we
have V 1(s0;r0) ¸ V 2(s0;r0) which implies W1(V 1(s0;r0);s0;r0) · W1(V 2(s0;r0);s0;r0). We
then conclude g1(V;s1;r) · g1(V;s2;r) implying that g12 ¸ 0. By de¯nition we have
W = ¦ + g, then if ¦12 ¸ 0 and g12 ¸ 0 we can see that W12 ¸ 0.
Analogously, let consider r1 < r2. Following a similar argument as above, we can
obtain V (s0;r1) ¸ V (s0;r2) if we assume that W is concave in V and W13 · 0. This con-




0)j(s;r1)] ¸ E[V (s
0;r
0)j(s;r2)]
Let yi(s0;r0) be the optimal continuation value from (V;s;ri) we can write:
(1 + r1)V = E[y
1(s
0;r







which implies y1(s0;r0) < y2(s0;r0). We will show that Bellman equation maps the
set of function with W13 · 0 into itself since W is strictly concave in V for V < ~ V (s0;r0),
¦13 · 0 and ¦ concave in V . Suppose that we start with a function W with W13 · 0.











which states that g13 · 0. This is a su±cient condition to obtain W13 · 0. Taking






(1 + r)2 · 0
Proof of Result 8.
This proof is long and is made in two steps. The ¯rst step is to prove that in the
optimal contract ¦1(V (s;r);s;r)=(1 + r) is weakly increasing in s and decreasing in r
using assumption 5. Let assume that W satis¯es the following:





is non-decreasing in s0 and non-increasing in r0
(15)
De¯ning TW as the function of the left hand side of (9), we can prove that TW
31also satis¯es (15). This guarantees that the statement in (15) is true using standard
dynamic programming arguments that state that the set of continuous functions that
satis¯es this property maps itself. Hence, assuming that TW1(V (s;r);s;r) is constant


















where s0 < s1 and Vi(s0;r0) is the optimal continuation value from (V (si;r);si;r).
We will see that ¦(V (s0;r);s0;r)=(1 + r) · ¦(V (s1;r);s1;r)=(1 + r) by contradiction.
If that is not true using (16) we can get that W1(V0(s0;r0);s0;r0) < W1(V1(s0;r0);s0;r0).
By concavity of W in V we obtain that V0(s0;r0) > V1(s0;r0) which in turn implies:









where the second inequality above comes from the concavity of ¦ in V . Now since







;s0;r) = ¦1(V (s0;r);s0;r) (18)
Combining (17) and (18) we establish that ¦1(V (s1;r);s1;r) >
¦1(V (s0;r);s0;r) which closes the contradiction argument. Using this condition that
states ¦(V (s;r);s;r) is non-decreasing in s and the assumption 5 we are able to show
that TW also holds the ¯rst part of property (15).
Similarly, we can prove the second part of property in (15). Suppose r0 < r1 and
32denote yi(s0;r0) the optimal continuation value from (V (s;ri);s;ri). The optimality
























If that is not the case, we get that W1(y0(s0;r0);s0;r0) > W1(y1(s0;r0);s0;r0) which in
turn implies y0(s0;r0) < y1(s0;r0) by concavity of W in V . This last conclusion implies

















= ¦1(V (s;r1);s;r1)=(1 + r1) (21)
As before, combining (20) and (21) the contradiction appears and we can conclude
that in the optimal contract ¦1(V (s;r);s;r)=(1 + r) is weakly decreasing in r. This
conclusion and assumption 5 ¯nally imply the second part of property in (15).
As a summary of this ¯rst step we conclude that W satis¯es property in (15) and in
33the optimal contract ¦(V (s;r);s;r)=(1+r) is weakly increasing in s and decreasing in r.
The second step of the proof uses the following claim. Take states described by
(V1;s1;r), (V0;s0;r), (V1;s;r1) and (V0;s;r0). Let Vi(s0;r0) and yi(s0;r0) denote the
continuation value from (Vi;si;r) and (Vi;s;ri), respectively. The claim states:
1: If s1 > s0 and W1(V1;s1;r) · W1(V0;s0;r) then
V1(s0;r0) ¸ V0(s0;r0) and W1(V1(s0;r0);s0;r0) · W1(V0(s0;r0);s0;r0)
2: If r1 > r0 and W1(V0;s;r0) · W1(V1;s;r1) then
y1(s0;r0) · y0(s0;r0) and W1(y1(s0;r0);s0;r0) ¸ W1(y0(s0;r0);s0;r0)
(22)
Let ^ V1 satisfy W1(^ V1;s1;r) = W1(V0;s0;r) ¸ W1(V1;s1;r). By concavity of W in V
we can see that ^ V1 · V1. Let ^ V1(s0;r0) be the optimal continuation value from (^ V1;s1;r).






Using similar arguments as in the ¯rst step we will prove that ¦1(^ V1;s1;r) ¸ ¦1(V0;s0;r).


















If ¦1(^ V1;s1;r) < ¦1(V0;s0;r) from (24) we get that W1(^ V1(s0;r0);s0;r0)
> W1(V0(s0;r0);s0;r0). The concavity of W implies that ^ V1(s0;r0) < V0(s0;r0) which
induces that













;s1;r)=(1 + r) ¸ ¦1(
E[V0(s0;r0)j(s0;r)]
1+r ;s0;r)=(1 + r)
= ¦1(V0;s0;r)=(1 + r)
(26)
Putting (25) and (26) together we obtain the contradiction. Therefore, we can con-
clude that ¦1(^ V1;s1;r) ¸ ¦1(V0;s0;r) and W1(^ V1(s0;r0);s0;r0) · W1(V0(s0;r0);s0;r0).
This last inequality implies that ^ V1(s0;r0) ¸ V0(s0;r0). Combining this with (23) we










This ends the proof of the ¯rst part of the claim in (22).
Analogously, to prove the second part of the claim in (22) we ¯rst de¯ne ^ V0 such
that W1(V1;s;r1) = W1(^ V0;s;r0) ¸ W1(V0;s;r0). Let ^ y0(s0;r0) be the continuation value
from (^ V0;s;r1). By concavity of W we get that ^ V0 · V0. Hence, the monotonicity of the






As before we can show that ¦1(V1;s;r1)=(1+r1) · ¦1(^ V0;s;r0)=(1+r0) by contradiction.










which in turn implies y1(s0;r0) · ^ y0(s0;r0) by concavity of W. Using the concavity
of ¦ we infer that:









By the conclusion in the ¯rst step we then can write:

























Using concavity of W and (27), we conclude that
y1(s0;r0) · y0(s0;r0) and W1(y1(s0;r0);s0;r0) ¸ W1(y1(s0;r0);s0;r0).
Having these two steps we can easily prove the Result 8. Taking two histories start-
ing from the same entrepreneur value V0:
36f(s0;r0);(s1;r1);:::;(sT¡1;rT¡1);(sT;rT)g
f(s0;r0);(^ s1;r1);:::;(^ sT¡1;rT¡1);(^ sT;rT)g
where st ¸ ^ st 8 t = 1;:::;T and s1 > ^ s1. Denote Vt and ^ Vt as the entrepreneur values
at t for the ¯rst and second history, respectively. Using the optimality condition of the
contract we have W1(V1;s1;r1) = W1(^ V1; ^ s1;r1) which implies V2(s0;r0) ¸ ^ V2(s0;r0) ap-
plying the claim in (22). Also, using implications obtained in Result 7 we conclude that
V2 > ^ V2. Moreover, the optimality condition for the continuation value and the fact that
W12 ¸ 0 imply W1(V2;s2;r2) · W1(^ V2; ^ s2;r2). Applying the same logic recursively, the
claim in (22) and the result 7 we conclude that Vt ¸ ^ Vt and W1(Vt;st;rt) · W1(^ Vt; ^ st;rt)
8 t · T.
Making use of similar steps we can use to prove the persistence in the interest rate
°uctuations. Assuming two histories:
f(s0;r0);(s1;r1);:::;(sT¡1;rT¡1);(sT;rT)g
f(s0;r0);(s1; ^ r1);:::;(sT¡1; ^ rT¡1);(sT; ^ rT)g
such that rt · ^ rt 8 t = 1;:::;T and r1 < ^ r1. Applying the claim in (22) and the
result 7 regarding the fact that W13 · 0 we can show recursively that Vt ¸ ^ Vt and
W1(Vt;st;rt) · W1(Vt;st; ^ rt), where Vt and ^ Vt are the optimal paths of the entrepreneur
value for the ¯rst and second history, respectively.
377 Appendix B: Description of Parameters for the
Simulation
To highlight the main analytical conclusions from the optimal contract we consider a
very simple speci¯cation of the revenue function and outside option:
² R(s;k) = sk®
² O(k;s;r) = ¸k
² s;r are iid
For the baseline simulation ® is set at 0:8, ¸ is 3:2. The comparison for the case of
better enforceability is analyzed changing ¸ to 2:8. We assume that productivity (s) and
interest rate (r) are independent and identically distributed over time and independent
each other. The mean and variance of s are 1 and 0:01, respectively. These same
moments for the interest rate are ¯xed at 0:04 and 0:001. In the implementation of the
















































































































































Figure 2: Enforceability of Contracts and Interest Rate Spread

















Figure 3: Value Function for di®erent level of current productivity
















Figure 4: Value Function for di®erent level of current interest rates













































































































































































Figure 5: Impulse Responses to a Reduction in Productivity















































































































































































Figure 6: Impulse Responses to an Increase in the Interest Rate
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